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E

NFORCEMENT—ALONG WITH rulemaking and rule application—
is a basic function of any system of governance.1 The effectiveness
of a governance system depends significantly on compliance with
the rules it produces.2 Compliance, in turn, depends in the first instance
on ex ante background factors that influence a person’s understanding of
the legitimacy of a governance system and its rules and the expected costs
and benefits of non-compliance.3 Enforcement is the process of obtaining a
person’s compliance or punishing a person’s non-compliance when ex ante
background factors fail to elicit compliance.4
In a governance system with courts, one basic type of enforcement is the
enforcement of court judgments. For example, if background factors do
not lead a judgment debtor to comply with a money judgment in the first
instance, enforcement measures may then be taken to compel payment to the

1 See AM Kjaer, Governance (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004) 10 (defining governance as
‘the setting of rules, the application of rules, and the enforcement of rules’).
2 See K Raustiala, ‘Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation’
(2000) 32 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 387, 388 (‘Compliance … is
typically an important aspect of the production of institutional effectiveness, but not the only
aspect’).
3 See JG March and JP Olsen, ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’
(1998) 52 International Organization 943 (distinguishing the logic of appropriateness and the
logic of consequences in decision-making); TR Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1990) (analysing the role of legitimacy in compliance).
4 Two clarifications are in order. First, enforcement is not necessarily a precondition for
compliance. A well-designed governance system that attends to background factors will tend to
elicit compliance without enforcement. Second, there can, of course, be a relationship between
background factors and enforcement. eg, punishment at the enforcement stage may feed back
into the background cost–benefit analysis, thus enhancing future compliance by other persons
without enforcement.
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judgment creditor. A standard enforcement measure is execution, whereby
a court issues an order directing an enforcement agent (such as a sheriff
or huissier de justice) to seize property of the judgment debtor, sell it, and
deliver the proceeds to the judgment creditor in satisfaction of the judgment.
The enforcement of court judgments is an important governance function
because courts themselves perform important governance functions.5 They
offer dispute resolution services in the form of litigation, and in the process
they authoritatively interpret rules and apply them to particular situations.
From the perspective of political science, courts not only resolve discrete disputes, but also contribute to the authoritative allocation of resources within
a society, thus answering a basic question of governance: Who gets what?6
When national courts decide cases involving parties of different nationalities or activities that occur or have effects in the territory of more than
one nation, they engage in what I call transnational judicial governance.7 In
addition to determining the rights and obligations of transnational actors,
they regulate extraterritorial activity and they allocate governance authority among nations, between national and international institutions, and
between private and public actors. For example, in transnational regulatory
litigation, national courts apply national regulatory norms to determine
rights and obligations of transnational actors.8 In transnational public law
litigation, ‘[p]rivate individuals, government officials, and nations sue one
another directly, and are sued directly, in a variety of judicial fora, most
prominently, domestic courts’,9 based on rights derived from both national

5 See M Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (Chicago, The University
of Chicago Press, 1981); M Shapiro and AS Sweet, On Law, Politics, And Judicialization
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002); CN Tate and T Vallinder (eds), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New York, NYU Press, 1995); RA Dahl, ‘Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker’ (1957) 6 Journal of Public Law 279;
CA Whytock, ‘Domestic Courts and Global Governance’ (2009) 84 Tulane Law Review 67.
6 The ‘who gets what’ question has long preoccupied scholars of domestic systems of governance. See, eg HD Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York, Whittseley
House, 1936). cf RM Cover, ‘Dispute Resolution: A Foreword’ (1979) 88 Yale Law Journal
910, 911 (noting that courts both solve disputes and distribute resources); M Shapiro, ‘From
Public Law to Public Policy, or the “Public” in “Public Law”’ (1972) 5 Political Science &
Politics 410, 413 (discussing ‘judicial allocation of values’).
7 For an in-depth analysis of transnational judicial governance, see Whytock (n 5) and CA
Whytock, ‘Transnational Judicial Governance’ (2012) 2 St John’s Journal of International &
Comparative Law 55. cf TL Putnam, ‘Courts Without Borders: Domestic Sources of US Extraterritoriality in the Regulatory Sphere’ (2009) 63 International Organization 459 (exploring
how domestic courts have come to regulate persons and conduct outside their states’ borders
by claiming jurisdiction over transactions with local and extraterritorial elements).
8 See generally HL Buxbaum, ‘Transnational Regulatory Litigation’ (2006) 46 Virginia
Journal of International Law 251, 253–54 (examining the rise in cases brought in US courts
under the Alien Tort Claims Act, applying international law norms to secure remedies for violation of those norms that would not otherwise be available).
9 HH Koh, ‘Transnational Public Law Litigation’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2347, 2348
(discussing how traditional domestic litigation and traditional international law litigation have
merged to form a blended body of ‘transnational’ public law).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3790981

Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 49
and international law. And in transnational private litigation, national
courts resolve transnational disputes under different nations’ private law
rules (for example rules governing torts, contracts and property)—rules that
reflect these nations’ respective distributive and regulatory policies.10
The same multinational connections that enable transnational judicial
governance can also create special enforcement challenges. If a court in one
nation (N1) issues a money judgment but the judgment debtor has no assets
in N1, enforcement may be impossible there. The judgment creditor may
then seek enforcement in another nation (N2) where the judgment debtor
does have assets. From N2’s perspective, the N1 judgment is a foreign judgment. The problem is that sovereignty principles and related customary
international law principles on jurisdiction generally prohibit nations from
taking enforcement measures in the territory of other nations. Moreover,
there is no general rule of international law requiring nations to enforce
foreign judgments. Therefore, the ability to enforce the N1 judgment in N2
depends on the willingness of an N2 court to order enforcement against the
judgment debtor’s N2 assets, which in turn depends on N2’s private international law (conflict of laws) rules.
The stakes are high both for nations, because the enforcement of foreign
judgments is one factor that determines the quality of transnational judicial
governance, and for individual litigants, because the enforcement of foreign
judgments affects their legal rights. In this chapter, I analyse the rules of
foreign judgment enforcement from both perspectives. I do so comparatively, with a focus on the private international law rules of the European
Union (EU) and United States (US) applicable to foreign judgments in civil
and commercial matters, in order to highlight how different approaches
strike different balances between two sets of enforcement values: governance values and rights values. Part I provides an overview of governance
values and rights values. Part II examines a spectrum of ideal-type and realworld approaches to foreign judgment enforcement—ranging from always
enforce, to the US and EU approaches to their respective internal judgments
(full faith and credit and the Brussels I Regulation), to national treatment
of external judgments, to never enforce—and explains how they score on
different governance values and rights values. Part III is more conjectural.
It proposes lessons of this chapter’s analysis for the design of private international law rules governing foreign judgments, and speculates about the
causes and consequences of the evolution of the law of foreign judgments in
the transatlantic area—including implications for the transnational market
for dispute resolution services.

10 See generally R Wai, ‘Transnational Private Litigation and Transnational Governance’
in M Lederer and PS Müller (eds), Criticizing Global Governance (New York, Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005) 243 (analysing transnational private litigation).
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I. ENFORCEMENT VALUES

Although enforcement is a basic governance function, it would be a mistake to understand enforcement in purely functional terms, because
enforcement—like private international law generally—implicates important societal values. In the context of foreign judgment enforcement,
enforcement values can be placed roughly into two categories: governance
values and rights values.11

A. Governance Values
Governance values focus on policies facilitating, guiding or restraining
collective activity.12 These values have implications that extend beyond
the parties to particular disputes.13 Governance values include efficiency,
which is concerned with avoiding the expenditure of societal resources to
re-litigate issues that have already been litigated, and with reducing transaction costs in transnational business.14 If N2 declines to enforce an N1
judgment, duplicative public resources of N2’s legal system and private
resources of the litigants will be expended if the claimant subsequently pursues the same claim in N2. These costs can be avoided—and efficiency thus
increased—if N2 renders duplicative litigation unnecessary by enforcing the
N1 judgment.
Closely related to efficiency is the principle of repose, which emphasises
‘the need to put to rest quarrels and disputes that have arisen so that the
energies of individuals and the resources of society can be devoted to more
constructive tasks’.15 One way of understanding repose is in terms of public
and private opportunity costs. If N2 declines to enforce the N1 judgment
11 For a preliminary sketch of these two types of values and their application to EU and
US private international law, see CA Whytock, ‘Faith and Scepticism in Private International
Law: Trust, Governance, Politics, and Foreign Judgments’ (2014) 7 Erasmus Law Review 113.
12 See RO Keohane, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World (London,
Routledge, 2002) 245–46 (defining governance as ‘the processes and institutions, both formal
and informal, that guide and restrain … collective activit[y]’).
13 See Whytock (n 5) 31.
14 See R Michaels, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’ in Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, available at www.mpepil.com (noting that ‘the general public has an interest in avoiding resources spent on re-litigation and in international
decisional harmonies’); AT von Mehren and DT Trautman, ‘Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach’ (1968) 81 Harvard Law Review 1601, 1603–04
(noting ‘desire to avoid the duplication of effort and consequent waste involved in reconsidering a matter that has already been litigated’). See also J Lookofsky and K Hertz, EU-PIL:
European Union Private International Law in Contract and Tort (New York, JurisNet, 2009)
135 (noting importance of foreign judgment enforcement to ‘promote efficiency and economy
in international business’).
15 AT Von Mehren, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments—General Theory
and the Role of Jurisdictional Requirements’ (1981) 167 Recueil des Cours 20–22.
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and the plaintiff files the same claim against the defendant in N2, then N2
will spend public resources for its courts to adjudicate the claim that it could
otherwise spend on other judicial matters, and the parties will spend private
resources on litigation that they could otherwise spend on more beneficial
endeavours. N2’s enforcement of the N1 judgment would bring the dispute
to an end and avoid these public and private opportunity costs.
Another governance value is certainty, which helps ‘establish the security
of contracts, promote commercial dealings, and generally further the rule of
law among states that are interdependent as well as independent’.16 Among
the uncertainties of transnational litigation is uncertainty about whether
an N1 judgment will be enforced in other nations. This uncertainty can
lead to financial and contractual uncertainty, because it is unclear whether a
judgment that otherwise would establish the parties’ financial and contractual responsibilities will ultimately be given effect. This uncertainty can be
avoided, and the parties’ planning for the future facilitated, if N2 enforces—
and is expected to enforce—N1 judgments.
A somewhat different governance value is comity. Comity is the respect
that one nation gives to another nation as a legally equal sovereign. Comity
may ‘foster … stability and unity in an international order’ by avoiding conflict among nations and by promoting reciprocity in the respect that nations
give to each other.17 N2 may owe no international legal obligation to N1
to enforce an N1 judgment, but by nevertheless enforcing it N2 furthers the
value of comity, thus avoiding the offence to (and perhaps conflict with) N1
that could be caused by N2’s refusal to respect the judgment, and encouraging N1 to reciprocate by enforcing N2 judgments.

B. Rights Values
Foreign judgment enforcement also implicates rights values. These values
focus on justice for particular litigants in particular cases. One rights value
is correctness, including both substantive and procedural correctness. As
Arthur von Mehren puts it, the ‘principle of correctness … expresses the
16 AF Lowenfeld, ‘International Litigation and the Quest for Reasonableness: General Court
on Private International Law’ (1994) 245 Recueil des Cours 109. See also Von Mehren and
Trautman (n 14) 1603–04 (noting ‘interest in fostering stability and unity in an international
order in which many aspects of life are not confined to any single jurisdiction …’); Michaels
(n 14) 2 (referring to ‘transnational legal certainty’ as a value underlying the enforcement of
foreign judgments).
17 Von Mehren and Trautman (n 14) 1603–04. See also Michaels (n 14) 2 (‘Dutch authors,
in particular Voet and Huber, developed [the principle of] comity, defined much later by the
United States Supreme Court in [Hilton v Guyot] a decision denying recognition to a French
judgment as “neither a matter of absolute obligation on the one hand nor of mere courtesy and
good will … it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive or judicial acts of another …”’).
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concern that legal justice, as understood by the society in both substantive
and procedural terms, be done’.18 Simply put, there is value in reaching an
outcome that is just and legally correct—both substantively and procedurally. N2’s enforcement of an incorrect N1 judgment would be at odds with
the value of correctness. For this reason, the judgment debtor may want the
N2 court to subject the N1 judgment to some degree of procedural or substantive scrutiny before it is enforced, or it may wish to have the N2 court
review the judgment in its entirety (révision au fond) to ensure a correct
outcome.
Closely related to the value of correctness are property rights. At least in
the case of money judgments, the standard enforcement measure is execution, a process whereby the judgment debtor’s property is seized and sold to
satisfy the judgment. If the judgment is not legally correct, then the taking of
the judgment debtor’s property to satisfy the judgment would not be legally
justified, leading to a violation of the judgment debtor’s property rights. For
this reason, the judgment debtor may want the N2 court to scrutinise the
N1 judgment to serve not only the intrinsically important value of correctness, but also the value of protecting the judgment debtor’s property rights.
Another rights value implicated by foreign judgment enforcement is
access to justice. Access to justice requires not only court access, but also a
remedy when a person is legally entitled to one.19 A plaintiff may be able to
obtain court access in N1 to pursue a claim against a defendant. But if the
N1 court issues a judgment in the plaintiff ’s favour, the defendant refuses to
satisfy the judgment and only has assets in N2, and N2 refuses to enforce
the judgment, then the plaintiff may lack a remedy altogether and thus be
denied meaningful access to justice. Moreover, in some cases a plaintiff—for
either legal or practical reasons—may lack access to an N2 court where the
prospective judgment debtor has assets. If N2 both fails to provide court
access and refuses to enforce an N1 judgment, the result may be a transnational access-to-justice gap.20 When N2 enforces an N1 judgment, N2 helps
complete the plaintiff ’s access to justice rights by providing a legal remedy.21
Governance values and rights values are not mutually exclusive. Protecting rights in particular cases can advance broader governance values,
and governance values like efficiency and certainty can benefit individual
18

Von Mehren (n 15) 20–22.
CA Whytock, ‘Foreign State Immunity and the Right to Court Access’ (2013) 93 Boston
University Law Review 2033; CA Whytock and CB Robertson, ‘Forum Non Conveniens and
the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’ (2011) 111 Columbia Law Review 1444, 1472.
20 Whytock and Robertson (n 19) 1472.
21 See XE Kramer, ‘Cross-Border Enforcement and the Brussels I-Bis Reg: Towards a New
Balance Between Mutual Trust and National Control Over Fundamental Rights’ (2013)
60 Netherlands International Law Review 343, 367 (‘The abolition of exequatur has … been
justified by the desire to enhance access to justice and the right to an effective remedy, as guaranteed by Art 47 of the EU Charter and Arts 6 and 13 of the ECHR. … From the perspective of
the judgment creditor, the interests are evidently to enforce his rights as a result of a judgment
in an efficient way’.).
19

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3790981

Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 53
litigants. On the other hand, no approach to foreign judgment enforcement
can simultaneously maximise all of these values.22 Value trade-offs are
therefore inevitable, and different approaches to foreign judgment enforcement will entail different trade-offs.

II. A SPECTRUM OF APPROACHES TO FOREIGN
JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT

In the absence of a global treaty on foreign judgment enforcement, there
are diverse private international law approaches to foreign judgments. One
way to arrange these approaches is along a spectrum indicating the extent to
which they tend to favour enforcement, from a categorical always-enforce
approach, to the usually-enforce approach that the US and the EU take to
their respective internal judgments, to the sometimes-enforce approach that
nations tend to take to external judgments, to a categorical never-enforce
approach. These approaches strike different trade-offs among various governance values and rights values.

A. Always Enforce
One approach to foreign judgments is always enforce. This approach scores
high on governance values. By enforcing the N1 judgment, N2 makes duplicative litigation unnecessary, brings the parties’ dispute to a close, and gives
respect to N1’s legal system, thus furthering the values of efficiency, repose,
certainty and comity. The always-enforce approach has mixed scores on
rights values. On the one hand, it promotes access to justice by ensuring
that a plaintiff can obtain a remedy based on a foreign judgment. On the
other hand, it does so without regard to correctness and property rights, and
therefore scores low on those values.

B. Usually Enforce: Full Faith and Credit and Internal US Judgments
A more nuanced approach is to usually enforce foreign judgments. An
example is the US full-faith-and-credit approach. The full-faith-and22 See Von Mehren (n 15) 22 (‘Embracing one [principle] to the complete exclusion of
the other would be intolerable. Assigning an absolute value to correctness would create an
enormous social and economic burden, unduly reward the disputatious, and undermine the
security of transactions and relations that is essential if economic and social life are to go
forward. On the other hand, giving full scope to the principle of repose would require that full
and absolute finality be given to every determination made by an adjudicator of first instance.
But … a system of justice that, in the name of repose, denied in every case a second chance
would be perceived as fundamentally unjust. … [A] tension persists between the two principles
and no solution can ever be entirely stable nor demonstrably correct’.).
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credit clause—contained in Article IV, Section 1 of the US Constitution—
provides that
[f]ull faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of every other state.

A federal statute—28 USC § 1738—implements the full-faith-and-credit
clause by requiring that all courts in the United States, including both state
and federal courts, give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of
US states.23
Full faith and credit is sometimes called an ‘iron law’ because it can require
one state (S2) to enforce another state’s (S1) judgment even if the judgment
is based on a mistake of fact or law.24 If the judgment debtor wishes to
challenge the S1 judgment on the merits, it must do so in S1’s courts—for
example, by appealing to an S1 appellate court—but it cannot do so in S2.25
There are narrow exceptions to the general rule. Full faith and credit does
not require S2 to enforce an S1 judgment if the S1 judgment was obtained
by fraud or if the S1 court did not have jurisdiction. However, if the S1 court
heard the issue of fraud or jurisdiction and decided against the judgment
debtor, the S2 court must give full faith and credit to that decision.26
The US Supreme Court has stated that there is no ‘roving public policy
exception’ to full faith and credit.27 According to the Court, ‘[t]he full faith
and credit clause is one of the provisions incorporated into the Constitution
by its framers for the purpose of transforming an aggregation of independent, sovereign States into a nation … [W]e are aware of [no] considerations
of local policy or law which could rightly be deemed to impair the force
and effect which the full faith and credit clause … require[s] to be given to
[a money] judgment outside the state of its rendition’.28 But ‘the issue will
not stay buried; like the mythical Phoenix, the notion that there is a “public
policy” exception to the Iron Law of Full Faith and Credit keeps trying to
rise from the ashes’.29 As one expert opines, however, ‘the Supreme Court
23 See 28 USC 1738 (‘The … judicial proceedings of any court of any … State, Territory or
Possession … shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States
and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State,
Territory or Possession from which they are taken’.).
24 WM Richman, WL Reynolds and CA Whytock, Understanding Conflict of Laws 4th edn
(New Providence, LexisNexis, 2013) 388.
25 ibid.
26 ibid, 393–94.
27 Baker v General Motors 522 US 222, 233–34 (1998). See, eg, Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws § 103 (‘A judgment rendered in one State of the United States need not be
recognized or enforced in a sister State if such recognition or enforcement is not required by the
national policy of full faith and credit because it would involve an improper interference with
important interests of the sister State’.); Reading & Bates v Baker Energy Resources 976 SW
2d 702 (Tex App 1998); Blackwell v Haslam, 2013 WL 3379364 (Tenn App 2013).
28 Baker v General Motors (n 27) 233–34 (citations omitted).
29 WL Reynolds and WM Richman, The Full Faith and Credit Clause (Westport, Praeger,
2005) 102.
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has not endorsed [a public policy exception] and its precedents seem to
negate it’.30
The US full-faith-and-credit approach is not far from the always-enforce
ideal type, and thus scores high on governance values, as well as on the rights
value of access to justice (albeit not as high as the always-enforce approach).
By allowing for the possibility of non-enforcement in S2 on the ground of
fraud or lack of S1 jurisdiction, the US full-faith-and-credit approach falls
short of maximising the governance values of efficiency, repose and certainty. Because full faith and credit applies to the S1 court’s decisions on
its own jurisdiction and on claims of fraud, however, the value of comity
nevertheless should ordinarily be protected. To a slightly greater extent than
the always-enforce approach, the US full-faith-and-credit approach furthers the rights values of correctness and property rights by providing some
protection against enforcement when the S1 judgment was a result of fraud
or the S1 court lacked jurisdiction. Any trade-off against access to justice
due to the fraud exception would seem to be an equitable one in cases where
it is the judgment creditor who committed the fraud.

C. Usually Enforce: The Brussels I Regulation and Internal EU Judgments
The private international law rules governing the enforcement of a judgment of a court of one EU member (M1) in another EU member (M2) are
contained in the recently recast Brussels I Regulation.31 These rules lie farther from the always-enforce end of the spectrum than the rules of US full
faith and credit, but, as explained below, they are getting closer. Under the
Brussels I Regulation, there is a general rule requiring enforcement of an M1
judgment in M2, unless one of the grounds for refusing enforcement listed
in Article 45(1) is found to exist:32
On the application of any interested party, the recognition of a judgment shall be
refused:
(a)

if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy (ordre public) in
the Member State addressed;
(b) where the judgment was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was
not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an
equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to

30 SC Symeonides, ‘Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2013: Twenty-Seventh Annual
Survey’ (2014) 62 American Journal of Comparative Law 223, 319.
31 Reg No 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) [2012] OJ L351/1 (hereinafter
Brussels I Reg).
32 See Brussels I Reg, Art 46 (‘On the application of the person against whom enforcement
is sought, the enforcement of a judgment shall be refused where one of the grounds referred to
in Article 45 is found to exist’.).
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arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings
to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so;
(c) if the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given between the same parties in the Member State addressed;
(d) if the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another
Member State or in a third State involving the same cause of action and
between the same parties, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State addressed; or
(e) if the judgment conflicts with: (i) [the special jurisdictional provisions of]
Sections 3, 4 or 5 of Chapter II where the policyholder, the insured, a beneficiary
of the insurance contract, the injured party, the consumer or the employee was
the defendant;33 or (ii) [the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of] Section 6 of
Chapter II.34

Overall, the Brussels I Regulation—like the US full-faith-and-credit
approach—scores high on the governance values of efficiency, repose, certainty and comity. In one respect, the Brussels I Regulation may score even
higher on these values because lack of personal jurisdiction is not a ground
for refusing enforcement (except pursuant to Article 45(1)(e), where the
judgment conflicts with the Brussels I Regulation’s special jurisdictional provisions designed to protect weak parties—but even then, Article 45(2) provides that M2 shall be bound by the findings of fact on which M1 based its
jurisdiction).35 However, this difference should not be overstated because,
as noted above, under the US law of full faith and credit, S2 must give full
faith and credit to an S1 court’s jurisdictional rulings. The most salient difference in terms of governance values is the Brussels I Regulation’s public
policy exception, which entails a trade-off against the values of efficiency,
repose, certainty and comity. However, because the public policy ground is
very narrow, this difference, too, should not be overstated.36

33 These provisions are intended to protect parties assumed to be relatively weak. See
M Bogdan, Concise Introduction to EU Private International Law 2nd edn (Groningen,
Europa Law Publishing, 2012) 53 (noting that the equivalent special jurisdictional provisions
in the Brussels I Reg are intended ‘to protect the weaker party (the person claiming insurance
benefits, the consumer, the employee) against being sued in other Member States than his own,
while at the same time giving the same weaker party the option to sue in his own country even
when the defendant is domiciled in another Member State’).
34 For example, ‘in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property … the courts of the Member State in which the property is situated’ has exclusive jurisdiction. Brussels I Reg, Art 24(1).
35 See P Hay, ‘The Development of the Public Policy Barrier to Judgment Recognition
Within the European Community’ (2007) 6 The European Legal Forum 289, 290 (noting that
the Brussels I Reg’s recognition command is in this respect stronger than US full faith and credit
‘because it is combined with jurisdictional bases that must be observed by rendering courts’).
36 See P Stone, EU Private International Law 2nd edn (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010) 239 (noting that the ECJ has ‘consistently emphasised’ that the public policy exception ‘should operate only in exceptional cases’).
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Similar to US full faith and credit, the same features that make the Brussels I
Regulation score high on governance values make it score lower on the
rights values of correctness and property rights, and relatively high on access
to justice.37 The absence of a fraud ground and a general jurisdictional
ground for refusal of enforcement might suggest an even lower score on
correctness and property rights (and a higher score on access to justice) than
US full faith and credit. The public policy exception, however, may allow
non-enforcement in a limited number of exceptional instances of fraud, particularly if the fraud is found to have precluded a fair trial,38 and in addition to the limited special jurisdictional grounds for refusal noted above,
there are protections for the right to adequate notice in Article 45(1)(b)
applicable to default judgments. More broadly, the public policy exception
can be understood as providing a ‘safety net’ that furthers the values of
correctness and property rights by allowing M2 to refuse enforcement of
an M1 judgment where M1 failed to provide procedural rights—including
those fair trial rights assured by Article 6(1) of the European Convention
on Human Rights39—which would go beyond the grounds for refusal
expressly available under the US law of full faith and credit. These doctrinal
nuances defy measurement. Comparative empirical analysis of actual court
decisions in US full-faith-and-credit and EU Brussels I Regulation enforcement cases would ultimately be necessary to evaluate which approach scores
higher on various governance values and rights values.
There is, however, a trend in the EU’s internal approach to foreign judgments in a direction that reflects a further emphasis on the governance values of efficiency, repose, certainty and comity and the rights value of access
37 Perhaps the EU emphasis on these governance values at the expense of the rights value of
correctness was most clearly expressed in the ECJ’s judgment in Turner, a jurisdiction case, in
which it ruled that a court of one EU member (in this case the United Kingdom) is prohibited
from issuing an antisuit injunction barring a party from pursuing proceedings in the same case
in a court of another EU member (in this case Spain) ‘even where that party is acting in bad
faith with a view to frustrating the existing proceedings’: Case 159/02 Turner [2004] ECR
I-3565, para 31. One US commentator argues that the ECJ’s approach in Turner ‘elevates a
quest for efficiency over a quest for equity’. R Brand, ‘Hague Academy of International Law’
(2011) 358 Recueil des Cours 9, 177. See also Case C-116/02 Gasser [2003] ECR I-14693,
para 54 (requiring Austria to dismiss a case under the first-court-seized rule where suit was
first filed in Italy, despite the parties’ exclusive choice-of-court agreement selecting an Austrian
court). Art 31 of the recast Brussels I Reg changes the rule announced in Gasser by prioritising
courts with exclusive jurisdiction under a choice-of-court agreement.
38 CMV Clarkson and J Hill, The Conflict of Laws 4th edn (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2011) 197. For an analysis of EU Member Court decisions on the applicability of the
Brussels I Reg’s public policy exception in cases where fraud is alleged, see Burkhard Hess,
Thomas Pfeiffer and Peter Schlosser, Report on the Application of Reg Brussels I in the Member States (Sep 2007, Study JLS/C4/2005/03), available at ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/
study_application_brussels_1_en.pdf.
39 XE Kramer, ‘Cross-border Enforcement in the EU: Mutual Trust versus Fair Trial?
Towards Principles of European Civil Procedure’ (2011) 2 International Journal of Procedural
Law 202, 219 (‘A safety net for the violation of fair trial principles is provided [by the Brussels I
Reg] at the enforcement level through the ground of refusal relating to public policy’.).
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to justice: EU law has made it progressively easier to enforce EU Member
judgments in other EU Members. Most notably, one of the highlights of
the recast Brussels I Regulation is the elimination of exequatur—that is, a
declaration of enforceability by M2—as a prerequisite for enforcement of
an M1 judgment in M2. In certain specialised areas of EU law, exequatur
had already been abolished.40 But implementing this change for judgments
in civil and commercial matters more generally is an important step toward
facilitating the enforcement of foreign judgments within the EU—albeit
arguably at the expense of the values of correctness and property rights.
As Peter Stone argues, ‘[t]he effect of the change—will usually be to reduce
from an already low level the protection which a defendant can obtain from
the courts of his own country’.41 Similarly, Andrew Dickinson argues that
exequatur provides significant protection against fraudulent enforcement
proceedings.42 Moreover, according to a recent study, the jurisprudence
of the European Court of Human Rights ‘clearly recognizes the value of
exequatur or similar proceedings for the protection of human rights of the
judgment debtor’.43 But others note that exequatur rarely resulted in nonenforcement anyway, and argue that in any event the ability of a judgment
debtor to apply for refusal of enforcement and appeal a decision to deny
that application renders the elimination of exequatur inconsequential from
a rights perspective.44 For example, Peter Hay argues that ‘abolition of the
exequatur streamlines the recognition process, but … does not change it
much substantively’.45 Similarly, Samuel Baumgartner argues that ‘the abolition of the declaration of enforceability sounds like a bolder move than it
really is’.46
40 See European Commission, ‘Impact assessment accompanying the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast)’ SEC(2010) 1547 final,
15 (hereinafter Impact Assessment) (noting abolition of exequatur in Reg 805/2004 of 21 April
2004 establishing a European enforcement order for uncontested claims [2004] OJ L143/15,
Reg 1896/2006 of 12 December 2006 creating a European Order for Payment Procedure
[2006] OJ L399/1, Reg 861/2007 of 11 July 2007 creating a European Small Claims Procedure [2007] OJ L199/1, and Reg 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law,
recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance
obligations [2009] OJ L7/1).
41 Stone (n 36) 265.
42 A Dickinson, ‘Surveying the Proposed Brussels I bis Reg—Solid Foundations but Renovation Needed’ (2010) 12 Yearbook of Private International Law 247, 267.
43 T Schilling, ‘The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the Jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights’ (January 2012) 4, available at works.bepress.com/theodor_schilling/9.
44 See B Hess, Note on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast) (Brussels, European Parliament, 2011), available at www.europarl.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2011/453201/IPOL-JURI_NT(2011)453201_EN.pdf.
45 P Hay, ‘Notes on the European Union’s Brussels-I “Recast” Regulation: An American
Perspective, European Legal Forum’ (2013) The European Legal Forum 1, 6.
46 SP Baumgartner, ‘Changes in the European Union’s Regime of Recognizing and Enforcing
Foreign Judgments and Transnational Litigation in the United States’ (2012) 18 Southwestern
Journal of International Law 567.
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But whether or not this move significantly undermines the rights values
of correctness and property rights, it indicates a stronger EU emphasis than
before on the governance values of efficiency, repose, certainty and comity.
In fact, these governance values are expressed in the Brussels I Regulation
itself. As its preamble notes, it is essential to eliminate ‘[c]ertain differences
between national rules governing jurisdiction and recognition of judgments
[that] hamper the sound operation of the internal market’ and to put in
place rules ‘to ensure rapid and simple recognition and enforcement of
judgments’,47 in furtherance of ‘the objective of free circulation of judgments in civil and commercial matters’.48 Regarding exequatur specifically, the preamble explains that ‘the aim of making cross-border litigation
less time-consuming and costly justifies the abolition of the declaration of
enforceability prior to enforcement in the Member State addressed’.49

D. Sometimes Enforce: The US Approach to External Judgments
US full-faith-and-credit applies only to judgments from within the US and
the Brussels I Regulation applies only to judgments from within the EU. In
that sense, they both deal with ‘internal’ judgments. Private international
law regarding ‘external’ judgments is generally farther from the alwaysenforce end of the spectrum than private international law regarding internal judgments. Some nations only enforce an external N1 foreign judgment
if a treaty with N1 requires them to do so, and some only enforce based on
reciprocity—that is, if N1 would enforce an N2 judgment under the same
circumstances.50 In other nations, including the United States, private international law takes a more nuanced sometimes enforce approach to external
foreign judgments by combining a general rule in favour of enforcement
with a list of grounds for refusal.51
In the US, state law (not federal law) generally provides the rules governing the enforcement of external foreign judgments. For many years, the most
common approach among US states was legislation based on the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, which was approved by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Uniform
Law Commission) in 1962 (1962 Act). The 1962 Act has three mandatory
and six discretionary grounds for refusal:
(a)

47
48
49
50
51

A foreign judgment is not conclusive if
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of
due process of law;

Preamble 4 of Brussels I Reg.
ibid, preamble 6.
Above n 47, recital 26.
Lookofsky and Hertz (n 14) 137–40.
R Brand, ‘Hague Academy of International Law’ (2011) 358 Recueil des Cours 9, 103.
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(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
(b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if
(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive
notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the … [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based is repugnant to
the public policy of this state;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement
between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings in that court; or
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign
court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.52

By including a wide range of grounds for refusing enforcement, the 1962
Act scores lower on the governance values of efficiency, repose, certainty
and comity and on the rights value of access to justice than either the US
full-faith-and-credit or the EU Brussels I Regulation approaches to internal
judgments. In terms of the values of correctness and property, the 1962 Act
scores relatively high by requiring or allowing an N2 court in the US to
refuse enforcement when it finds one of the enumerated procedural defects
or fraud.
In 2005, however, the Uniform Law Commission adopted a new uniform
act to replace the 1962 Act: the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act of 2005 (2005 Act). The 2005 Act adds two discretionary grounds for refusal not contained in the 1962 Act, providing that a
court need not recognise a foreign-country judgment if:
(7)
(8)

the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial doubt
about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the judgment; or
the specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the judgment was not
compatible with the requirements of due process of law.53

This change invites US judges to more closely scrutinise the specific foreign proceedings leading to a judgment. Traditionally, the failure of due

52 See ss 3 and 4 of Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962 (1962).
See ss 481 and 482 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
attempts to restate the common law of foreign judgment enforcement, and it is for the most
part consistent with the 1962 Act.
53 See s 4(c) of 2005 Act. Moreover, in 2005, the American Law Institute adopted a proposed federal statute on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments that included a
mandatory version of the 2005 Act’s judicial integrity exception. See American Law Institute,
‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute’
s 5(a)(ii) (2006) (barring recognition or enforcement if ‘the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial and justifiable doubt about the integrity of the rendering court
with respect to the judgment in question’) (hereinafter ALI Proposed Statute).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3790981

Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 61
process in a particular case has not been sufficient to refuse enforcement.54
Nevertheless, a growing number of US States are enacting legislation based
on the 2005 Act, and today there are already more 2005 Act States than
1962 Act States.55 Thus, the 2005 Act and its new case-specific grounds for
refusal are rapidly becoming the norm in US law.
The shift toward new case-specific grounds for non-enforcement is a shift
towards a greater emphasis on the rights values of correctness and property. On the other hand, this trend cuts against the governance values of
efficiency, repose, certainty and comity. Commentators in the US are not
unaware of these costs. For example, the American Law Institute rejected
a case-specific due process exception in its proposed federal statute on
foreign judgments, explaining that ‘[s]uch a detailed inquiry into the foreign judgment is inconsistent with the pro-enforcement philosophy of [the
1962] Act’.56 Similarly, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
expressed the concern that a case-specific approach would be ‘inconsistent with providing a streamlined, expeditious method for collecting money
judgments rendered by courts in other jurisdictions’ and ‘would in effect
[allow] a further appeal on the merits … thus converting every successful
multinational suit for damages into two suits …’.57 Concerns from an access
to justice perspective have also been raised.58 But these concerns ultimately
have not carried the day, as suggested by the increasingly widespread adoption of the 2005 Act by US States.

54 See s 4 of 1962 Act (providing systemic but not case-specific due process exception).
However, based on a review of US court decisions, one scholar has concluded that even when
courts apply the systemic due process standard, they in fact tend to consider case-specific factors. See PB Stephan, ‘Unjust Legal Systems and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’ in
PB Stephan (ed), Foreign Court Judgments and the United States Legal System (Leiden, Brill,
2014).
55 The US Virgin Islands and 15 states have legislation based on the 1962 Act: Alaska,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and Virginia. However, two of these states—
Massachusetts and Virginia—have introduced pending legislation based on the 2005 Act. See
www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Foreign%20Money%20Judgments
%20Recognition%20Act (last visited 4 March 2014). The District of Columbia and 18 states
have adopted legislation based on the 2005 Act: Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington. In addition, legislation based on the 2005
Act has been introduced in Massachusetts, Mississippi and Virginia. See www.uniformlaws.org/
LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Foreign-Country%20Money%20Judgments%20Recognition
%20Act (last visited 4 March 2014).
56 See s 5, comment c, of ALI Proposed Statute.
57 Society of Lloyd’s v Ashenden, 233 F 3d 473, 477 (7th Cir 2000).
58 CA Whytock, ‘Some Cautionary Notes on the “Chevronization” of Transnational Litigation’ (2013) 1 Stanford Journal of Complex Litigation 467, 479; Whytock and Robertson
(n 19).
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E. Never Enforce
Finally, as a point of comparison, it is helpful to consider a categorical never
enforce approach. By preventing enforcement of an N1 judgment in N2, this
approach scores low on the governance values of efficiency, repose, certainty
and comity. It has mixed scores on rights values, however. It is agnostic as to
the value of correctness in the sense that it refuses enforcement without any
inquiry into the judgment’s actual substantive or procedural correctness. It
scores high on the value of property rights because it categorically protects
the judgment debtor’s N2 property from being used to satisfy the N1 judgment (albeit in an unprincipled way that is not linked to correctness). And
it scores low on the value of access to justice by preventing a successful
plaintiff from obtaining a remedy in N2 based on the N1 judgment, even in
situations where the judgment debtor’s only assets are in N2.

III. BROADER IMPLICATIONS: DESIGN, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

The analysis presented above has implications for the design of private international law rules on foreign judgment enforcement. It also raises questions
about the factors that influence how these rules evolve and about the impact
of various approaches to foreign judgment enforcement on the market for
dispute resolution services.

A. Fundamental Design Principles
As demonstrated above, different approaches to foreign judgment enforcement reflect different trade-offs between different enforcement values. These
trade-offs are inevitable because governance values and rights values cannot
be simultaneously maximised. For example, as this chapter’s analysis shows,
scores on the values of efficiency, repose, certainty, comity and access to
justice tend to be inversely correlated with scores on the values of correctness and property rights. This means that in any effort to design or reform
private international law rules, a single-minded focus on a particular subset of these values is likely to result in rules that have unintended negative
consequences for other values. This suggests two fundamental principles of
design for rules governing foreign judgments:
—
—

First, the implications of the rules for all governance and rights values
should be thoroughly analysed before settling on a given approach.
Second, the inevitable trade-offs among these values should be made
explicitly and transparently by lawmakers.
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B. Explaining the Evolution of Foreign Judgment Enforcement
Stepping back from design principles, what factors might explain—as a
matter of positive theory—how the law of foreign judgments evolves from
the never-enforce end of the spectrum toward the always-enforce end of the
spectrum (or vice versa)?
—

First, the evolution of private international law rules governing foreign judgments is likely to be strongly influenced by cross-national
patterns of procedural and substantive legal convergence. Specifically,
other things being equal, as cross-national procedural and substantive convergence increases, procedural and substantive grounds for
refusal are likely to decrease. This is because procedural grounds for
non-enforcement are less necessary if the nations involved have similar procedural rules, and substantive grounds for non-enforcement—
such as public policy—are less important if those nations have similar
substantive law and policy.

It would seem that there is more procedural and substantive convergence
among US States than among EU members, and more convergence in each
of these cases than among nations globally. Therefore, it is not surprising
that the US internal full-faith-and-credit approach is closest to the alwaysenforce approach, with the EU’s internal Brussels I Regulation approach
slightly farther away from it, and the US approach to external foreign judgments still farther away. This may also help explain the rejection of the
European Commission’s proposal to eliminate the public policy exception
in the recast Brussels I Regulation.59
—

Second, the evolution of private international law rules governing
foreign judgments is likely to be strongly influenced by levels of mutual
trust among nations. Specifically, other things being equal, as mutual
trust increases, grounds for refusal are likely to decrease.

In the EU, the concept of mutual trust has played an animating role in private international law since at least the early 1990s. In Sonntag v Waidmann,
59 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on Jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters (recast)’ COM(2010) 748 final, (hereinafter Brussels I Recast Proposal).
The proposal did add, however, a limited right for a judgment debtor to ‘apply for a refusal of
recognition or enforcement of a judgment where such recognition or enforcement would not
be permitted by the fundamental principles underlying the right to a fair trial’ (Art 46) and
it preserved the public policy ground for certain specified defamation and collective redress
claims (Art 37). See Kramer (n 21) 365 (noting that the proposed removal of the public policy
exception was ‘extensively debated’ and arguing that ‘[t]he protection of public policy is to be
regarded as a matter of the rule of law and has always been regarded as a necessary safety valve
in private international law’).
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a 1993 case before the European Court of Justice, Advocate General Darmon stated in his opinion that
[t]he principle of the recognition of judgments is based on the Member States’
mutual trust in their respective legal systems and judicial institutions. This trust
allows the Member States to waive their internal rules on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments.60

The recast Brussels I Regulation explicitly links the abolition of exequatur
to mutual trust:
Mutual trust in the administration of justice in the Union justifies the principle
that judgments given in a Member State should be recognised in all Member States
without the need for any special procedure. … As a result, a judgment given by the
courts of a Member State should be treated as if it had been given in the Member
State addressed.61

Conversely, where there is less mutual trust, more grounds for refusal are
likely. In the US, both of the new case-specific exceptions added by the
2005 Act were justified in terms of a lack of ‘mutual trust’ even though the
exact words are not used. As the Study Report for the 2005 Act pointed
out regarding its new case-specific due process exception, ‘[t]here is less
expectation that foreign courts will follow procedures comporting with
U.S. notions of due process and jurisdiction or that they will apply substantively tolerable laws, and there may be suspicions of unfairness or fraud’.62
The Reporter’s Notes to a draft of the 2005 Act also noted support for the
2005 Act’s case-specific judicial integrity exception based on the perception
that ‘bribery and other forms of judicial misconduct can be a real issue
with regard to certain foreign country judgments’.63 The federal statute

60 Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in Case C-172/91 Sonntag v Waidmann [1993]
ECR I-1963, paras 71–72.
61 Recital 26 of Brussels I Recast. X Kramer, ‘Procedure Matters: Construction and Deconstructivism in European Civil Procedure’ (2012) 33 Erasmus Law Lectures 18 (‘Based on this
pillar [mutual trust], the European Commission wishes to abolish the permission of courts for
the enforcement of judgments rendered in another EU Member State. The idea is that if there is
full mutual trust, this permission (called exequatur) is no longer required’).
62 K Patchel, Study Report on Possible Amendment of the Uniform Foreign MoneyJudgments Recognition Act, 25 June 2003, 26, available at www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/
foreign%20country%20money%20judgments%20recognition/ufmjra_apr04_studyrpt.pdf.
63 Discussion Draft of 2005 Act, October 2004, 7. The American Law Institute’s commentary on the corruption ground for non-enforcement in its proposed federal statute on foreign judgments also expresses distrust, noting ‘concerns about corruption in the judiciaries of
certain countries’. The drafters acknowledge that ‘[t]he defense of possible corruption in the
rendering court is one that has not traditionally been an explicit ground for nonrecognition or
nonenforcement by courts in the United States’. But they explain that ‘concerns about corruption in the judiciaries of certain countries and the effect of corruption in the particular case led
to inclusion of this additional defense’.
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on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments proposed by the
American Law Institute in 2005 justified its mandatory judicial integrity
exception in similar terms:
The defense of possible corruption in the rendering court is one that has not traditionally been an explicit ground for nonrecognition or nonenforcement by courts
in the United States. However, concerns about corruption in the judiciaries of
certain countries and the effect of corruption in the particular case led to inclusion
of this additional defense.64

It is noteworthy that the European Commission has also used lack of mutual
trust as a reason for not extending the Brussels I regime to non-EU members, raising concerns that ‘companies might not always get a fair trial and
an adequate protection of their rights before the courts of a third State’ and
that ‘[s]uch problems can notably arise in countries where the judiciary cannot be considered to be independent or is riven by corruption’.65 Similarly,
in his opinion in Owusu v NB Jackson, Advocate General Léger explained
that the EU established the simplified Brussels Convention mechanism for
recognition and enforcement
in a specific context characterised by mutual trust between the Member States of
the Community regarding their legal systems and their judicial institutions. However, the same situation does not necessarily prevail in relations between Member
States and non-Contracting States. That is why this mechanism of the Convention
applies only to judgments given by courts of a Member State in the context of
their recognition and enforcement in another Member State.66

These two conjectures imply that further substantive and procedural convergence between EU members on the one hand and US states on the other
hand, accompanied by measures to build an area of transatlantic mutual
trust in the administration of justice, could improve prospects for the ratification and implementation of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements and, perhaps eventually, on a more generally applicable framework for the transatlantic enforcement of foreign judgments.

C. Enforcement of Judgments and the Market for Dispute
Resolution Services
Yet another consideration is the effect of different approaches to foreign
judgment enforcement on the market for dispute resolution in civil and
commercial matters. This market has two dimensions: an international
64

ALI Proposed Statute (n 53) 60 (comment d on s 5).
Impact Assessment (n 40) 20.
66 Opinion of Advocate General Léger in Case C-281/02 Owusu v NB Jackson and others
[2005] ECR I-1383, para 144.
65
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dimension, which involves competition among nations, and a public–
private dimension, which involves competition between national courts
and arbitration. The law of foreign judgments affects both dimensions of
competition.
—

First, other things being equal, rules favouring enforcement of judgments among a group of nations is likely to increase competition among
the courts of those nations.

Absent such rules, a plaintiff will have a strong incentive to sue in the
courts of a nation (N1) where the defendant has assets, even if the courts
of another nation (N2) are more efficient or otherwise more appropriate.
This is because if the plaintiff sues in N2 and obtains a favourable judgment there, it may not be possible to enforce that judgment in N1. In contrast, with rules favouring the enforcement of N2 judgments in N1 (and vice
versa), the plaintiff ’s choice of court will not depend so heavily on concerns
about enforcement, and competition between N1 and N2 courts will instead
be based primarily on their other respective advantages and disadvantages
as providers of dispute resolution services.
Of course other considerations (especially jurisdictional rules) can also
affect this competition. But holding those considerations constant, the
implication is that competition among national courts would be greater
among US states and among EU members where rules favour enforcement
of internal judgments than between courts in the US and courts in the EU.
A party may prefer an EU member’s courts, but sue in the US because that
is where the defendant’s assets lie (or vice versa). This distorts the international dimension of competition for dispute resolution services in the transatlantic area. A further implication is that an EU–US judgment enforcement
agreement or a multinational agreement with enforcement provisions (such
as the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements) could enhance
the international dimension of competitiveness of the market for dispute
resolution services in the transatlantic area.
—

Second, other things being equal, rules favouring enforcement of
judgments among a group of nations is likely to increase competition
between the courts of those nations and arbitration.

Private international law rules governing the enforcement of foreign judgments has an important impact on this public–private dimension of the
market for dispute resolution services. One of the major advantages of arbitration as a method of transnational dispute resolution is that most nations
tend to enforce foreign arbitral awards, subject to narrow and exclusive
grounds for refusal, in accordance with the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention)
and similar regional arrangements. This gives parties an incentive to select
arbitration even if they otherwise have strong reasons to prefer litigation in
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a national court (such as a desire for an appellate review process). The lack
of an analogous treaty regime for the enforcement of foreign judgments distorts this dimension of the market for dispute resolution services.
If, for example, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
enters into effect for a significant number of nations, enforcement issues
will no longer tip the scale in favour of arbitration to the extent they do
now.67 And even now, where litigation in an EU member’s courts is at least
as attractive to a claimant as arbitration, the Brussels I Regulation’s rules on
enforcement should significantly level the playing field when the respondent
has assets in at least one EU member’s territory, and the same would seem
to be the case internally to the US full-faith-and-credit regime.
None of the foregoing is meant to suggest that unbridled competition
for dispute resolution services is necessarily desirable. The point is simply
that when designing an approach to foreign judgment enforcement, private
international law-makers should be attentive to the implications of their
rules for both the international and public–private dimensions of the market for dispute resolution services. Further interdisciplinary study of the
implications of different approaches to foreign judgment enforcement for
governance values and rights values, and of the causes and consequences of
variation across different approaches, promises to provide important foundations for understanding and reforming private international law in the
transatlantic area and beyond.

67

Brand (n 37) 149–51.
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